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Abstract
Background: The null hypothesis significance test (NHST) is the most frequently used statistical method, although its 
inferential validity has been widely criticized since its introduction. In 1988, the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors (ICMJE) warned against sole reliance on NHST to substantiate study conclusions and suggested 
supplementary use of confidence intervals (CI). Our objective was to evaluate the extent and quality in the use of NHST 
and CI, both in English and Spanish language biomedical publications between 1995 and 2006, taking into account 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors recommendations, with particular focus on the accuracy of the 
interpretation of statistical significance and the validity of conclusions.
Methods: Original articles published in three English and three Spanish biomedical journals in three fields (General 
Medicine, Clinical Specialties and Epidemiology - Public Health) were considered for this study. Papers published in 
1995-1996, 2000-2001, and 2005-2006 were selected through a systematic sampling method. After excluding the 
purely descriptive and theoretical articles, analytic studies were evaluated for their use of NHST with P-values and/or CI 
for interpretation of statistical "significance" and "relevance" in study conclusions.
Results: Among 1,043 original papers, 874 were selected for detailed review. The exclusive use of P-values was less 
frequent in English language publications as well as in Public Health journals; overall such use decreased from 41% in 
1995-1996 to 21% in 2005-2006. While the use of CI increased over time, the "significance fallacy" (to equate statistical 
and substantive significance) appeared very often, mainly in journals devoted to clinical specialties (81%). In papers 
originally written in English and Spanish, 15% and 10%, respectively, mentioned statistical significance in their 
conclusions.
Conclusions: Overall, results of our review show some improvements in statistical management of statistical results, 
but further efforts by scholars and journal editors are clearly required to move the communication toward ICMJE 
advices, especially in the clinical setting, which seems to be imperative among publications in Spanish.
Background
The null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) has been
the most widely used statistical approach in health
research over the past 80 years. Its origins dates back to
1279 [1] although it was in the second decade of the
twentieth century when the statistician Ronald Fisher for-
mally introduced the concept of "null hypothesis" H0 -
which, generally speaking, establishes that certain param-
eters do not differ from each other. He was the inventor
of the "P-value" through which it could be assessed [2].
Fisher's P-value is defined as a conditional probability cal-
culated using the results of a study. Specifically, the P-
value is the probability of obtaining a result at least as
extreme as the one that was actually observed, assuming
that the null hypothesis is true. The Fisherian significance
testing theory considered the p-value as an index to mea-
sure the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis
in a single experiment. The father of NHST never
endorsed, however, the inflexible application of the ulti-
mately subjective threshold levels almost universally
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adopted later on (although the introduction of the 0.05
has his paternity also).
A few years later, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson con-
sidered the Fisherian approach inefficient, and in 1928
they published an article [3] that would provide the theo-
retical basis of what they called hypothesis statistical test-
ing. The Neyman-Pearson approach is based on the
notion that one out of two choices has to be taken: accept
the null hypothesis taking the information as a reference
based on the information provided, or reject it in favor of
an alternative one. Thus, one can incur one of two types
of errors: a Type I error, if the null hypothesis is rejected
when it is actually true, and a Type II error, if the null
h y p o t h e s i s  i s  a c c e p t e d  w h e n  i t  i s  a c t u a l l y  f a l s e .  T h e y
established a rule to optimize the decision process, using
the p-value introduced by Fisher, by setting the maximum
frequency of errors that would be admissible.
The null hypothesis statistical testing, as applied today,
is a hybrid coming from the amalgamation of the two
methods [4]. As a matter of fact, some 15 years later, both
procedures were combined to give rise to the nowadays
widespread use of an inferential tool that would satisfy
none of the statisticians involved in the original contro-
versy. The present method essentially goes as follows:
given a null hypothesis, an estimate of the parameter (or
parameters) is obtained and used to create statistics
whose distribution, under H0, is known. With these data
the P-value is computed. Finally, the null hypothesis is
rejected when the obtained P-value is smaller than a cer-
tain comparative threshold (usually 0.05) and it is not
rejected if P is larger than the threshold.
The first reservations about the validity of the method
began to appear around 1940, when some statisticians
censured the logical roots and practical convenience of
Fisher's P-value [5]. Significance tests and P-values have
repeatedly drawn the attention and criticism of many
authors over the past 70 years, who have kept questioning
its epistemological legitimacy as well as its practical
value. What remains in spite of these criticisms is the
lasting legacy of researchers' unwillingness to eradicate or
reform these methods.
Although there are very comprehensive works on the
topic [6], we list below some of the criticisms most uni-
versally accepted by specialists.
• The P-values are used as a tool to make decisions in
favor of or against a hypothesis. What really may be
r e l e v a n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t o  g e t  a n  e f f e c t  s i z e  e s t i m a t e
(often the difference between two values) rather than
rendering dichotomous true/false verdicts [7-11].
• The P-value is a conditional probability of the data,
provided that some assumptions are met, but what
really interests the investigator is the inverse probabil-
ity: what degree of validity can be attributed to each
of several competing hypotheses, once that certain
data have been observed [12].
• The two elements that affect the results, namely the
sample size and the magnitude of the effect, are inex-
tricably linked in the value of p and we can always get
a lower P-value by increasing the sample size. Thus,
the conclusions depend on a factor completely unre-
lated to the reality studied (i.e. the available resources,
which in turn determine the sample size) [13,14].
• Those who defend the NHST often assert the objec-
tive nature of that test, but the process is actually far
from being so. NHST does not ensure objectivity.
This is reflected in the fact that we generally operate
with thresholds that are ultimately no more than con-
ventions, such as 0.01 or 0.05. What is more, for many
years their use has unequivocally demonstrated the
inherent subjectivity that goes with the concept of P,
regardless of how it will be used later [15-17].
• In practice, the NHST is limited to a binary
response sorting hypotheses into "true" and "false" or
declaring "rejection" or "no rejection", without
demanding a reasonable interpretation of the results,
as has been noted time and again for decades. This
binary orthodoxy validates categorical thinking,
which results in a very simplistic view of scientific
activity that induces researchers not to test theories
about the magnitude of effect sizes [18-20].
Despite the weakness and shortcomings of the NHST,
they are frequently taught as if they were the key inferen-
tial statistical method or the most appropriate, or even
the sole unquestioned one. The statistical textbooks, with
only some exceptions, do not even mention the NHST
controversy. Instead, the myth is spread that NHST is the
"natural" final action of scientific inference and the only
procedure for testing hypotheses. However, relevant spe-
cialists and important regulators of the scientific world
advocate avoiding them.
Taking especially into account that NHST does not
offer the most important information (i.e. the magnitude
of an effect of interest, and the precision of the estimate
of the magnitude of that effect), many experts recom-
mend the reporting of point estimates of effect sizes with
confidence intervals as the appropriate representation of
the inherent uncertainty linked to empirical studies [21-
25]. Since 1988, the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors (ICMJE, known as the Vancouver Group)
incorporates the following recommendation to authors of
manuscripts submitted to medical journals: "When possi-
ble, quantify findings and present them with appropriate
indicators of measurement error or uncertainty (such as
confidence intervals). Avoid relying solely on statistical
hypothesis testing, such as P-values, which fail to convey
important information about effect size" [26].Silva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
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As will be shown, the use of confidence intervals (CI),
occasionally accompanied by P-values, is recommended
as a more appropriate method for reporting results. Some
authors have noted several shortcomings of CI long ago
[27]. In spite of the fact that calculating CI could be com-
plicated indeed, and that their interpretation is far from
simple [28,29], authors are urged to use them because
they provide much more information than the NHST and
do not merit most of its criticisms of NHST [30]. While
some have proposed different options (for instance, likeli-
hood-based information theoretic methods [31], and the
Bayesian inferential paradigm [32]), confidence interval
estimation of effect sizes is clearly the most widespread
alternative approach.
Although twenty years have passed since the ICMJE
began to disseminate such recommendations, systemati-
cally ignored by the vast majority of textbooks and hardly
incorporated in medical publications [33], it is interesting
to examine the extent to which the NHST is used in arti-
cles published in medical journals during recent years, in
order to identify what is still lacking in the process of
eradicating the widespread ceremonial use that is made
of statistics in health research [34]. Furthermore, it is
enlightening in this context to examine whether these
patterns differ between English- and Spanish-speaking
worlds and, if so, to see if the changes in paradigms are
occurring more slowly in Spanish-language publications.
In such a case we would offer various suggestions.
In addition to assessing the adherence to the above
cited statistical recommendation proposed by ICMJE rel-
ative to the use of P-values, we consider it of particular
interest to estimate the extent to which the significance
fallacy is present, an inertial deficiency that consists of
attributing -- explicitly or not -- qualitative importance or
practical relevance to the found differences simply
because statistical significance was obtained.
Many authors produce misleading statements such as
"a significant effect was (or was not) found" when it
should be said that "a statistically significant difference
was (or was not) found". A detrimental consequence of
this equivalence is that some authors believe that finding
out whether there is "statistical significance" or not is the
aim, so that this term is then mentioned in the conclu-
sions [35]. This means virtually nothing, except that it
indicates that the author is letting a computer do the
thinking. Since the real research questions are never sta-
tistical ones, the answers cannot be statistical either.
Accordingly, the conversion of the dichotomous outcome
produced by a NHST into a conclusion is another mani-
festation of the mentioned fallacy.
The general objective of the present study is to evaluate
the extent and quality of use of NHST and CI, both in
English- and in Spanish-language biomedical publica-
tions, between 1995 and 2006 taking into account the
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors rec-
ommendations, with particular focus on accuracy regard-
ing interpretation of statistical significance and the
validity of conclusions.
Methods
We reviewed the original articles from six journals, three
in English and three in Spanish, over three disjoint peri-
ods sufficiently separated from each other (1995-1996,
2000-2001, 2005-2006) as to properly describe the evolu-
tion in prevalence of the target features along the selected
periods.
The selection of journals was intended to get represen-
tation for each of the following three thematic areas: clin-
ical specialties (Obstetrics & Gynecology and  Revista
Española de Cardiología); Public Health and Epidemiol-
ogy (International Journal of Epidemiology and Atención
Primaria) and the area of general and internal medicine
(British Medical Journal and Medicina Clínica). Five of
the selected journals formally endorsed ICMJE guide-
lines; the remaining one (Revista Española de Cardi-
ología) suggests observing ICMJE demands in relation
with specific issues. We attempted to capture journal
diversity in the sample by selecting general and specialty
journals with different degrees of influence, resulting
from their impact factors in 2007, which oscillated
between 1.337 (MC) and 9.723 (BMJ). No special reasons
guided us to choose these specific journals, but we opted
for journals with rather large paid circulations. For
instance, the Spanish Cardiology Journal is the one with
the largest impact factor among the fourteen Spanish
Journals devoted to clinical specialties that have impact
factor and Obstetrics & Gynecology has an outstanding
impact factor among the huge number of journals avail-
able for selection.
It was decided to take around 60 papers for each bien-
nium and journal, which means a total of around 1,000
papers. As recently suggested [36,37], this number was
not established using a conventional method, but by
means of a purposive and pragmatic approach in choos-
ing the maximum sample size that was feasible.
Systematic sampling in phases [38] was used in apply-
ing a sampling fraction equal to 60/N, where N is the
number of articles, in each of the 18 subgroups defined by
crossing the six journals and the three time periods. Table
1 lists the population size and the sample size for each
subgroup. While the sample within each subgroup was
selected with equal probability, estimates based on other
subsets of articles (defined across time periods, areas, or
languages) are based on samples with various selection
probabilities. Proper weights were used to take into
account the stratified nature of the sampling in these
cases.Silva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
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Forty-nine of the 1,092 selected papers were eliminated
because, although the section of the article in which they
were assigned could suggest they were originals, detailed
scrutiny revealed that in some cases they were not. The
sample, therefore, consisted of 1,043 papers. Each of
them was classified into one of three categories: (1)
purely  descriptive  papers, those designed to review or
characterize the state of affairs as it exists at present, (2)
analytical papers, or (3) articles that address theoretical,
methodological or conceptual issues. An article was
regarded as analytical if it seeks to explain the reasons
behind a particular occurrence by discovering causal rela-
tionships or, even if self-classified as descriptive, it was
carried out to assess cause-effect associations among
variables. We classify as theoretical  or  methodological
those articles that do not handle empirical data as such,
and focus instead on proposing or assessing research
methods. We identified 169 papers as purely descriptive
or theoretical, which were therefore excluded from the
sample. Figure 1 presents a flow chart showing the pro-
cess for determining eligibility for inclusion in the sam-
ple.
To estimate the adherence to ICMJE recommendations,
we considered whether the papers used P-values, confi-
dence intervals, and both simultaneously. By "the use of
P-values" we mean that the article contains at least one P-
value, explicitly mentioned in the text or at the bottom of
a table, or that it reports that an effect was considered as
statistically significant. It was deemed that an article uses
CI if it explicitly contained at least one confidence inter-
val, but not when it only provides information that could
allow its computation (usually by presenting both the
estimate and the standard error). Probability intervals
p r o v i d e d  i n  B a y e s i a n  a n a l y s i s  w e r e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  c o n f i -
dence intervals (although conceptually they are not the
same) since what is really of interest here is whether or
not the authors quantify the findings and present them
with appropriate indicators of the margin of error or
uncertainty.
In addition we determined whether the "Results" sec-
tion of each article attributed the status of "significant" to
an effect on the sole basis of the outcome of a NHST (i.e.,
without clarifying that it is strictly statistical signifi-
cance). Similarly, we examined whether the term "signifi-
cant" (applied to a test) was mistakenly used as
synonymous with substantive, relevant or important. The
use of the term "significant effect" when it is only appro-
priate as a reference to a "statistically significant differ-
e n c e , "  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  d i r e c t  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e
significance fallacy [39] and, as such, constitutes one way
to detect the problem in a specific paper.
We also assessed whether the "Conclusions," which
sometimes appear as a separate section in the paper or
otherwise in the last paragraphs of the "Discussion" sec-
tion mentioned statistical significance and, if so, whether
any of such mentions were no more than an allusion to
results.
Table 1: Sizes of the populations (and the samples) for selected journals and periods.
Clinical General 
Medicine
Public Health and 
Epidemiology
Period G&O REC BMJ MC IJE AP Total
1995-1996 623 (62) 125 (60) 346 (62) 238 (61) 315 (60) 169 (60) 1816 (365)
2000-2001 600 (60) 146 (60) 519 (62) 196 (61) 286 (60) 145 (61) 1892 (364)
2005-2006 537 (59) 144 (59) 474 (62) 158 (62) 212 (61) 167 (60) 1692 (363)
Total 1760 (181) 415 (179) 1339 (186) 592 (184) 813 (181) 481 (181) 5400 (1092)
G&O: Obstetrics & Gynecology; REC: Revista Española de Cardiología; BMJ: British Medical Journal; MC: Medicina Clínica; IJE: International Journal 
of Epidemiology; AP: Atención Primaria.
Figure 1 Flow chart of the selection process for eligible papers.Silva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/44
Page 5 of 9
T o  p e r f o r m  t h e s e  a n a l y s e s  w e  c o n s i d e r e d  b o t h  t h e
abstract and the body of the article. To assess the han-
dling of the significance issue, however, only the body of
the manuscript was taken into account.
The information was collected by four trained observ-
ers. Every paper was assigned to two reviewers. Disagree-
ments were discussed and, if no agreement was reached,
a third reviewer was consulted to break the tie and so
moderate the effect of subjectivity in the assessment.
In order to assess the reliability of the criteria used for
the evaluation of articles and to effect a convergence of
criteria among the reviewers, a pilot study of 20 papers
from each of three journals (Clinical Medicine, Primary
Care, and International Journal of Epidemiology) was per-
formed. The results of this pilot study were satisfactory.
Our results are reported using percentages together with
their corresponding confidence intervals. For sampling
errors estimations, used to obtain confidence intervals,
we weighted the data using the inverse of the probability
of selection of each paper, and we took into account the
complex nature of the sample design. These analyses
were carried out with EPIDA T [40], a specialized com-
puter program that is readily available.
Results
A total of 1,043 articles were reviewed, of which 874
(84%) were found to be analytic, while the remainders
were purely descriptive or of a theoretical and method-
ological nature. Five of them did not employ either P-val-
ues or CI. Consequently, the analysis was made using the
remaining 869 articles.
Use of NHST and confidence intervals
The percentage of articles that use only P-values, without
even mentioning confidence intervals, to report their
results has declined steadily throughout the period ana-
lyzed (Table 2). The percentage decreased from approxi-
mately 41% in 1995-1996 to 21% in 2005-2006. However,
it does not differ notably among journals of different lan-
guages, as shown by the estimates and confidence inter-
vals of the respective percentages. Concerning thematic
areas, it is highly surprising that most of the clinical arti-
cles ignore the recommendations of ICMJE, while for
general and internal medicine papers such a problem is
only present in one in five papers, and in the area of Pub-
lic Health and Epidemiology it occurs only in one out of
six. The use of CI alone (without P-values) has increased
slightly across the studied periods (from 9% to 13%), but
it is five times more prevalent in Public Health and Epide-
miology journals than in Clinical ones, where it reached a
scanty 3%.
Ambivalent handling of the significance
While the percentage of articles referring implicitly or
explicitly to significance in an ambiguous or incorrect
way - that is, incurring the significance fallacy -- seems to
decline steadily, the prevalence of this problem exceeds
69%, even in the most recent period. This percentage was
almost the same for articles written in Spanish and in
English, but it was notably higher in the Clinical journals
(81%) compared to the other journals, where the problem
occurs in approximately 7 out of 10 papers (Table 3). The
kappa coefficient for measuring agreement between
observers concerning the presence of the "significance
fallacy" was 0.78 (CI95%: 0.62 to 0.93), which is consid-
ered acceptable in the scale of Landis and Koch [41].
Reference to numerical results or statistical significance in 
Conclusions
The percentage of papers mentioning a numerical finding
as a conclusion is similar in the three periods analyzed
(Table 4). Concerning languages, this percentage is nearly
twice as large for Spanish journals as for those published
in English (approximately 21% versus 12%). And, again,
the highest percentage (16%) corresponded to clinical
journals.
A similar pattern is observed, although with less pro-
nounced differences, in references to the outcome of the
NHST (significant or not) in the conclusions (T able 5).
The percentage of articles that introduce the term in the
"Conclusions" does not appreciably differ between arti-
cles written in Spanish and in English. Again, the area
where this insufficiency is more often present (more than
15% of articles) is the Clinical area.
Discussion
There are some previous studies addressing the degree to
which researchers have moved beyond the ritualistic use
of NHST to assess their hypotheses. This has been exam-
ined for areas such as biology [42], organizational
research [43], or psychology [44-47]. However, to our
knowledge, no recent research has explored the pattern
of use P-values and CI in medical literature and, in any
case, no efforts have been made to study this problem in a
way that takes into account different languages and spe-
cialties.
At first glance it is puzzling that, after decades of ques-
tioning and technical warnings, and after twenty years
since the inception of ICMJE recommendation to avoid
NHST, they continue being applied ritualistically and
mindlessly as the dominant doctrine. Not long ago, when
researchers did not observe statistically significant
effects, they were unlikely to write them up and to report
"negative" findings, since they knew there was a high
probability that the paper would be rejected. This has
changed a bit: editors are more prone to judge all findings
as potentially eloquent. This is probably the frequent
denunciations of the tendency for those papers present-
ing a significant positive result to receive more favorable
publication decisions than equally well-conducted onesSilva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
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that report a negative or null result, the so-called publica-
tion bias [48-50]. This new openness is consistent with
the fact that if the substantive question addressed is really
relevant, the answer (whether positive or negative) will
also be relevant.
Consequently , even though it was not an aim of our
study, we found many examples in which statistical signif-
icance was not obtained. However, many of those nega-
tive results were reported with a comment of this type:
"The results did not show a significant difference between
groups; however, with a larger sample size, this difference
would have probably proved to be significant". The prob-
lem with this statement is that it is true; more specifically,
it will always be true and it is, therefore, sterile. It is not
fortuitous that one never encounters the opposite, and
equally tautological, statement: "A significant difference
between groups has been detected; however, perhaps with
a smaller sample size, this difference would have proved to
be not significant". Such a double standard is itself an
unequivocal sign of the ritual application of NHST.
Although the declining rates of NHST usage show that,
gradually, ICMJE and similar recommendations are hav-
ing a positive impact, most of the articles in the clinical
setting still considered NHST as the final arbiter of the
research process. Moreover, it appears that the improve-
ment in the situation is mostly formal, and the percentage
of articles that fall into the significance fallacy is huge.
The contradiction between what has been conceptually
recommended and the common practice is sensibly less
acute in the area of Epidemiology and Public Health, but
the same pattern was evident everywhere in the mechani-
cal way of applying significance tests. Nevertheless, the
clinical journals remain the most unmoved by the recom-
mendations.
The ICMJE recommendations are not cosmetic state-
ments but substantial ones, and the vigorous exhorta-
tions made by outstanding authorities [51] are not mere
intellectual exercises due to ingenious and inopportune
methodologists, but rather they are very serious episte-
mological warnings.
In some cases, the role of CI is not as clearly suitable
(e.g. when estimating multiple regression coefficients or
because effect sizes are not available for some research
designs [43,52]), but when it comes to estimating, for
example, an odds ratio or a rates difference, the advantage
of using CI instead of P values is very clear, since in such
cases it is obvious that the goal is to assess what has been
called the "effect size."
The inherent resistance to change old paradigms and
practices that have been entrenched for decades is always
high. Old habits die hard. The estimates and trends out-
lined are entirely consistent with Alvan Feinstein's warn-
ing 25 years ago: "Because the history of medical research
also shows a long tradition of maintaining loyalty to
established doctrines long after the doctrines had been
discredited, or shown to be valueless, we cannot expect a
sudden change in this medical policy merely because it
Table 2: Prevalence of NHST and CI across periods, languages and research areas.
Total of papers P-values and no CI CI and P-values CI and no P-values
n % (95%CI) n % (95%CI) n % (95%CI)
Period 1995-1996 285 119 41 (35 to 47) 138 49 (43 to 55) 28 10 (6 to13)
2000-2001 278 101 38 (31 to 44) 150 51 (44 to 58) 27 11 (6 to 15)
2005-2006 306 65 21 (16 to 26) 198 65 (59 to 71) 43 14 (9 to 17)
Language Spanish 396 156 39 (34 to 43) 211 54 (49 to 59) 29 7 (5 to 10)
English 473 129 32 (28 to 36) 275 55 (51 to 60) 69 12 (10 to 15)
Area Clinical 300 166 52 (45 to 58) 125 45 (39 to 51) 9 3 (1 to 6)
General Medicine 278 69 22 (17 to 27) 170 61 (55 to 67) 39 17 (12 to 22)
Public Health and 
Epidemiology
291 50 18 (13 to 23) 191 65 (59 to 71) 50 17 (13 to 22)
CI: Confidence IntervalSilva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/44
Page 7 of 9
has been denounced by leading connoisseurs of statistics
[53]".
It is possible, however, that the nature of the problem
has an external explanation: it is likely that some editors
prefer to "avoid troubles" with the authors and vice versa,
thus resorting to the most conventional procedures.
Many junior researchers believe that it is wise to avoid
long back-and-forth discussions with reviewers and edi-
tors. In general, researchers who want to appear in print
and survive in a publish-or-perish environment are moti-
Table 3: Frequency of occurrence of the significance fallacy across periods, languages and research areas.
Criteria Categories Number of papers
examined
Frequency of 
occurrence of the
significance fallacy
%
(95%CI)
Period 1995-1996 285 224 80 (75 to 85)
2000-2001 278 210 78 (72 to 83)
2005-2006 306 216 70 (64 to 75)
Language Spanish 396 295 73 (69 to 78)
English 473 355 76 (73 to 80)
Area Clinical 300 248 81(76 to 86)
General Medicine 278 200 72 (66 to 77)
Public
Health and Epidemiology
291 202 71 (66 to 76)
CI: Confidence Interval
Table 4: Frequency of use of numerical results in conclusions across periods, languages and research areas.
Criteria Categories Number of papers
examined
Frequency of use of 
numerical results
in conclusions
%
(95%CI)
Period 1995-1996 285 44 15 (10 to 19)
2000-2001 278 48 15 (10 to 20)
2005-2006 306 45 12,1 (8 to 16)
Language Spanish 396 85 21 (17 to 25)
English 473 52 12 (9 to 15)
Area Clinical 300 58 16 (12 to 21)
General Medicine 278 39 13 (9 to 17)
Public Health and 
Epidemiology
291 40 12 (8 to 15)
CI: Confidence IntervalSilva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
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vated by force, fear, and expedience in their use of NHST
[54]. Furthermore, it is relatively natural that simple
researchers use NHST when they take into account that
some theoretical objectors have used this statistical anal-
ysis in empirical studies, published after the appearance
of their own critiques [55].
For example, Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion  published a bibliometric study [56] discussing the
impact of statisticians' co-authorship of medical papers
on publication decisions by two major high-impact jour-
nals: British Medical Journal and Annals of Internal Med-
icine. The data analysis is characterized by
methodological orthodoxy. The authors just use chi-
square tests without any reference to CI, although the
NHST had been repeatedly criticized over the years by
two of the authors:
Douglas Altman, an early promoter of confidence inter-
vals as an alternative [57], and Steve Goodman, a critic of
NHST from a Bayesian perspective [58]. Individual
authors, however, cannot be blamed for broader institu-
tional problems and systemic forces opposed to change.
The present effort is certainly partial in at least two
ways: it is limited to only six specific journals and to three
biennia. It would be therefore highly desirable to improve
it by studying the problem in a more detailed way (espe-
cially by reviewing more journals with different profiles),
and continuing the review of prevailing patterns and
trends.
Conclusions
Overall, results of our review show some improvements
in statistical management of statistical results, but further
efforts by scholars and journal editors are clearly required
to move the communication toward ICMJE advices, espe-
cially in the clinical setting, which seems to be imperative
among publications in Spanish.
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Table 5: Frequency of presence of the term Significance (or statistical significance) in conclusions across periods, 
languages and research areas.
Criteria Categories Number of papers
examined
Frequency of presence of significance
in conclusions
%
(95%CI)
Period 1995-1996 285 35 14 (9 to 19)
2000-2001 278 32 12 (8 to 16)
2005-2006 306 41 14 (9 to 19)
Language Spanish 396 39 10 (7 to 13)
English 473 69 15 (11 to 18)
Area Clinical 300 44 16 (11 to 20)
General Medicine 278 30 11 (7 to 15)
Public Health and 
Epidemiology
291 34 12 (8 to 16)
CI: Confidence IntervalSilva-Ayçaguer et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:44
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